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NITA A. FARAHANY*
In April of 2005, a group of scientists, scholars, policymakers, and legal
professionals gathered at Duke Law School to discuss the implications of
attempts to introduce behavioral biology evidence into the criminal justice
system. The conference, entitled “The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the
Criminal Law,” was sponsored by Law and Contemporary Problems; the
Institute for Genome Science and Policy’s Center for Genome Ethics, Law, and
Policy; and the Science and Technology Law Section of the American Bar
Association. The articles published in this symposium reflect the presentations
and commentary from that conference and demonstrate the multidisciplinary
nature of the issues that arise from introducing behavioral genetics evidence
into criminal proceedings.
The first two articles of the volume serve as a primer on the meaning of
behavioral genetics, an introduction to recent scientific strides in the field and
to its limitations in explaining the causes of human behavior. In the first article,
Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial Behavior, scientists Laura A.
Baker, Serena Bezdjian, and Adrian Raine discuss the methodologies and
results of behavioral genetics studies focusing on such traits as antisocial
behavior, aggression, and behaviors associated with criminal conduct.1 Their
article describes in detail the classic methods as well as more recent research
designs of behavioral genetics studies, along with the various assumptions,
strengths, and weaknesses of each approach. It discusses the leading scientific
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research in behavioral genetics that addresses the genetic and social risk factors
contributing to antisocial personality disorder. The article further shows that
behavior arises from a complex interaction between genetic and environmental
factors, dispelling the notion of behavioral genetics as a study of genetic
determinism. Finally, the authors explain that although the study of human
behavioral genetics may elucidate the genetic and environmental factors driving
behavioral differences among individuals in a population, it cannot explain the
causes of behavior in any specific individual or any specific act by an individual.
Jonathan Kaplan’s article, Misinformation, Misrepresentation, and Misuse of
Human Behavioral Genetics Research, offers a more skeptical approach to the
results of the vast array of scientific studies attempting to decipher the
relationships among genes, behavior, and development.2 He discusses the
limitations of human behavioral genetics studies, highlighting the research
limitations inherent in studying humans and the narrow policy and legal
applicability of results arising from studying variation in human behavior. His
article provides an important cautionary message regarding mis- or overinterpretation of research results from behavioral genetics studies. He
concludes that, from a scientific perspective, behavioral genetics provides little
relevant information regarding defendants in the criminal justice system.
The article by Owen D. Jones, and the one by Brent Garland and Mark S.
Frankel then place behavioral genetics research into a broader scientific, legal,
and policy context. Jones’s article, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context,
situates the discussion of behavioral genetics by grounding it within broader
areas of the law and other fields of behavioral biology.3 He explains the
relationship between behavioral genetics and other disciplines in behavioral
biology, highlighting how the discussions and conclusions in this volume fit
within the broader debate. He also aptly notes that the criminal law is but one
of many fields of law potentially affected by behavioral genetics. He compares
the potential contributions of behavioral genetics and behavioral ecology and
suggests how the diverging efforts could be joined. He then offers a foundation
for the rest of the articles in the volume by introducing principles that have
gained consensus among scientists and commentators, including a recognition
of the complexity of behavior, the rejection of genetic determinism, and the
critically important agreement that the science of behavioral genetics and its
introduction into the criminal law does not implicate or justify Social
Spencerism or eugenics. Finally, Jones notes that genetic factors that contribute
to behavioral differences in a population could be treated the same as
environmental factors, despite the incongruity in how each is currently received.
In Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About Behavioral Genetics,
Neuroscience, and Law, Brent Garland and Mark S. Frankel emphasize the
2. Jonathan Kaplan, Misinformation, Misrepresentation, and Misuse of Human Behavioral
Genetics Research, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Winter/Spring 2006).
3. Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81
(Winter/Spring 2006).
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timeliness of this volume by calling for scientists, lawyers, courts, and
lawmakers to begin the critical dialogue about the implications of scientific
discoveries and technological advances on the criminal law.4 They also stress
the need to discuss the behavioral sciences now, before their use in the criminal
justice system becomes unchecked. Garland and Frankel contribute the
perspective of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) and put the issues discussed in this volume into the context of public
policy dialogues about both behavioral genetics and the neurosciences. Their
article demonstrates the natural parallels between neuroscience and behavioral
genetics and explains their predictions for the broad ways in which such
evidence may be used in the criminal law: in mitigation of criminal
responsibility for defendants addicted to drugs and alcohol, and in “preformal”
situations, that is, those occurring before criminal charges are filed. Through
their discussion of the shared history of neuroscience and behavioral genetics,
the actual and potential use of these disciplines, and the differences between the
two fields, Garland and Frankel provide a powerful and compelling case for the
urgency of addressing the implications of behavioral sciences in the criminal
law.
Building upon this foundation, the following articles in the volume focus on
particular issues arising from the study of behavioral genetics and the criminal
law. The article I co-authored with James E. Coleman Jr. and the one by
Stephen J. Morse opine that irrespective of its scientific utility, behavioral
genetics has little relevance to the concept of criminal responsibility. In
Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal from the Crime, Coleman
and I discuss the attempted use of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal
cases, and why, as a matter of criminal responsibility theory, such evidence has
and should have a limited evidentiary role.5 Our discussion focuses first on
claims advanced by defendants using behavioral genetics evidence, including
attempts to introduce genetic predispositions to negate the voluntary act
requirement or mens rea, to satisfy the requirement of mental disease or defect
for insanity defenses, and as mitigation during sentencing. We then explain that
in spite of its potential scientific utility, behavioral genetics has limited
applicability to criminal responsibility as a matter of criminal law theory. In so
doing, we explain the meaning and characteristics of the concepts underlying
criminal responsibility, with a detailed consideration of the components of
criminal liability and the operation of the reasonable person standard in
justifications and excuses to negate criminal liability. Using behavioral genetics
as a tool, we offer a coherent approach to understanding criminal responsibility
and its limiting characteristics, and demonstrate why behavioral genetics

4. Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About
Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (Winter/Spring 2006).
5. Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman Jr., Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal
from the Crime, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (Winter/Spring 2006).
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evidence should thereby be rejected under the current understanding of
criminal responsibility.
Stephen J. Morse’s article, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility,
focuses more specifically on drug and alcohol addiction, with a similar
conclusion about the limited relevance of behavioral genetics evidence to
criminal responsibility.6 In light of the abundance of studies focusing on the
genetic contributions to addiction, Morse develops a meaningful background on
the legal and scientific images of behavior, the disease concept of addiction, and
the aspects of addiction for which a person may be held legally accountable.
His article is essential reading for those seeking to understand the implications
of behavioral genetics research regarding compulsive behavior. He explains the
features of addiction that may be relevant to excuses in the criminal law,
whether addicts are responsible for their own addiction and why new evidence
regarding biological contributions to compulsion and craving do not negate a
defendant’s accountability in the criminal law. Morse makes an important
contribution to the continuing dialogue about addiction by introducing several
policy proposals for how such evidence could be used to reduce addiction and
its resulting criminal behavior.
With Deborah W. Denno’s Revisiting the Legal Link Between Genetics and
Crime, the volume shifts to explore some of the additional legal and social
issues that arise from the study of behavioral genetics and its introduction into
the criminal justice system. Denno provides an invaluable update to her earlier
work detailing the potential implications arising from the high-profile case of
Stephen Mobley, who sought to introduce a then-cutting-edge theory that
violence could be based on a genetic or neurochemical abnormality as
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing.7 Denno discusses the original
controversy concerning the use of genetic evidence at the time of Mobley’s trial,
including such concerns as the potential abuse of such information, its
relationship with concepts of free will, the impact of such information on jurors,
and the potential stigma associated with genetic predispositions. She then
reevaluates those concerns in light of the significant scientific progress that has
been made in the field since Mobley. The review of cases in her article affords a
complementary perspective to the cases that Coleman and I discuss by looking
at the procedural posture of the cases when such information was introduced
and the procedural hurdles leading to rejection of such evidence by the courts.
Based on her review, she explains that in spite of her earlier predictions, the
role of behavioral genetics in the criminal law still remains largely theoretical
and has yet to gain widespread acceptance.
The next several articles address the implications and limitations of ongoing
behavioral genetics research. David H. Kaye offers a comprehensive discussion
6. Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 165 (Winter/Spring 2006).
7. Deborah W. Denno, Revisiting the Legal Link Between Genetics and Crime, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (Winter/Spring 2006).
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of DNA databanks and the potential use of such databanks for behavioral
genetics research in his article, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal
DNA Databases.8 He addresses the concern that DNA databanks serve as a
limitless repository for future research and that the samples used in the
databanks could be used for research into a “crime gene.” Kaye provides a
compelling explanation of why, given the nature of the samples used in DNA
databanks and the difficulties and limitations of behavioral genetics studies, the
search for a “crime gene” is unlikely by scientists. Nonetheless, he agrees that
the concerns about the limitless use of these samples cannot be so easily
dismissed. He provides a thorough review of state and federal DNA databank
legislation and explains that although such legislation likely prohibits “crime
gene” investigations, greater protections for privacy are needed to ensure that
future amendments do not override such protections. Finally, he addresses
some of the bioethical and social arguments against “crime gene” research using
samples stored in DNA repositories, particularly given the involuntary
contribution of many such samples and the ethics of retaining these samples at
all. He significantly advances the policy debate on this issue by proposing
mechanisms for guarding against unauthorized use of DNA repositories.
Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill then consider the unfortunate
probability that behavioral genetics evidence will be misused to substantiate
predictions of future dangerousness in their article, Genetic Predictions of
Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?9 They discuss the
problems with using actuarial instruments to refine the accuracy of future
dangerousness predictions, which are employed in contexts including death
penalty proceedings, sex offender registrations, and post-sentence
commitments. Beecher-Monas and Garcia-Rill explain in significant detail the
scientific reality of behavioral genetics evidence, including a step-by-step
account of the complex interaction between genes, proteins, nerve cells,
biochemical and neurochemical pathways, and the environment, which combine
to give rise to human behavior. Their detailed account affords a critical
understanding of the amount and complexity of information necessary for
behavioral genetics to offer any insight into predictions of future
dangerousness. Their discussion makes apparent that in its present state,
behavioral genetics research cannot improve predictions of future
dangerousness, and only with significant further scientific progress might such
information have relevance.
Finally, Karen Rothenberg and Alice Wang’s article, The Scarlet Gene:
Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and Ethnic Stigma, is a powerful
discussion of the broader social implications of researching traits of interest to

8. D.H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 259 (Winter/Spring 2006).
9. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is
There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301 (Winter/Spring 2006).
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the criminal law.10 The article is framed by the PBS television program Genes
on Trial: Genetics, Behavior, and the Law, in which participants discussed the
situation of the fictitious Tracy Islanders, an ethnic group with a higher
incidence of alcoholism, attributable in part to the increased incidence of a
particular gene variant in the population. The article considers the social
impact for those who participate in behavioral genetics studies, particularly
when such research focuses on behaviors related to conduct such as addiction.
Rothenberg and Wang explain that such studies often focus on discrete and
insular ethnic groups because of their relatively homogeneous gene pools. Such
groups may suffer stigmatization if particular genetic variations are discovered
that contribute to behavioral variations in that population. The article
considers the potential for genetic reductionism and determinism, which would
shift the focus away from other contributions to violence (including
environmental and societal ones) and instead narrowly address the genetic
contributions of behavioral differences. Rothenberg and Wang’s article
addresses whether certain types of research should be conducted at all, as well
as the ethical and social concerns that arise from both the study of behavioral
genetics as it relates to criminal behavior and the introduction of that
information into criminal cases.
In sum, this symposium affords an in-depth background and analysis of
critical issues arising from behavioral genetics research and its use in the
criminal justice system. Although the use of behavioral genetics evidence in
criminal cases has been relatively limited, one commentator recently noted:
We stand, in all likelihood, at the threshold of an era in which we will see progressive
growth in our knowledge of the genetic bases of behavior. Genes that alone or in
combination with environmental influences put persons at high risk of violence and
other crimes will be identified. Faced with that prospect, it would behoove us to think
through now how we believe our criminal justice system should be responding to the
11
inevitable dilemmas that will arise.

Together, these articles represent an important effort to address the “inevitable
dilemmas that will arise” from the introduction of behavioral genetics, and
behavioral biology more generally, into the criminal law.

10. Karen Rothenberg & Alice Wang, The Scarlet Gene: Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and
Racial and Ethnic Stigma, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (Winter/Spring 2006).
11. Paul S. Applebaum, Behavioral Genetics and the Punishment of Crime, 56 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 25, 27 (2005).

